

## Phil 101H — Meeting 17

### Huxley

Pro-Descartes:

- Frogs can engage in sophisticated behavior even when brain damaged in ways that seem to prevent the relevant (or any) feelings/sensation
  - Humans sometimes report no feelings from the relevant parts of their body (or at all) but still engage in sophisticated behavior (pull away from tickles, navigate room)
- So animals don't NEED consciousness to explain their behavior — they're AUTOMATA, behavior can be explained MECHANISTICALLY

Contra-Descartes:

Arguments that nonetheless animals HAVE consciousness (1. Continuity; 2. what happens when stick yourself with a pin)

Nonetheless their actions are explained/determined wholly by mechanical processes in their brain, not by conscious feelings or decisions; they are “conscious automata”

Pictures of mental/physical causation: physicalist, parallelist dualist, interactionist dualist, epiphenomenalist dualist

### Gennaro on interactionism

pp. 29-30 Introduces

- pp. 31-33 Objection 1: How does the interface work? (some discussion of “overcausing”/“overdetermining”)
- pp. 33-35 Objection 2: “Causation involves a transfer of energy,” but Total Energy is Conserved
- pp. 36-39 Objection 3: Brain Damage causes mental defects

### van Inwagen's Arguments Against Dualism/For Physicalism

- p. 260 (1 paragraph): interaction violates conservation? “Pairing problem”
- p. 260 (1 paragraph): We usually talk/act as if we ourselves had physical properties, were visible
- pp. 260-62: Remote Control Argument
- pp. 262-265: Would physical duplicate of you have the same mental properties?

### We'll consider against Interactionism

1. van Inwagen's “Remote Control” argument (see also Gennaro's Objection 3)
2. Problems about how souls “interface with” the physical world
  - a. Princess Elisabeth and Descartes
  - b. Conservation of Energy and/or Momentum
  - c. Pairing Problem
3. Worries about “Too Many Causes” (*will discuss next week*)