In recent meetings we have asked whether animals and intelligent machines might qualify as persons, and what it would mean to recognize interests or rights belonging to them. Heller also invited us to distinguish a creature’s interests morally counting from its having rights that can protect it even when disregarding those rights would produce greater overall benefits. As we emphasized before, rights need not necessarily be absolute: a sufficiently important competing consideration might justify overriding them.
Warren examines a more systematic question: What makes a being entitled to full and equal moral standing? Could one psychological characteristic provide the answer, or might there be several different grounds for moral rights?
Some useful distinctions:
Having some moral standing is not automatically having full and equal moral standing, or possessing every right that others possess.
A moral agent is capable of understanding and acting from moral reasons, and can be held responsible for how it treats others. Moral agency involves more than intelligence: an excellent problem-solver is not necessarily capable of acting from moral reasons.
It is controversial whether moral agency is required for any moral standing, or even for full and equal moral standing.
In earlier meetings we distinguished a psychological notion of person (a being possessing certain mental capacities) from a moral notion (a being possessing certain rights or moral importance). Warren primarily uses person in the psychological sense, and argues that it shouldn’t simply be equated with human being. Whether being a person in this psychological sense is necessary or sufficient for full moral standing is a further question.
Some of the theories Warren examines treat being a person, in some psychological sense, as the only basis for moral standing. She calls these Personhood Only views. Her own Personhood Plus view holds that psychological personhood matters, but that other considerations can also provide grounds for moral standing—even full and equal moral standing.
A maximalist understanding of psychological personhood requires moral agency (or at least the potential for it). A minimalist understanding requires some capacities for thought and self-awareness, but not moral agency. Neither definition by itself settles who ought to have which rights.
It helps to distinguish necessary from sufficient conditions. If moral agency is sufficient for full moral standing, every moral agent has full moral standing. That leaves open whether nonagents can have it too. If moral agency is necessary, no being lacking moral agency can have full moral standing. The two claims are importantly different.
Immanuel Kant was a Prussian (German) philosopher active in the late 1700s.
On the view Warren attributes to Kant, what gives persons their special moral standing is their capacity to govern their conduct by rational moral principles. Persons have moral value in their own right, not merely because of their usefulness to others. It’s wrong to treat them as mere tools for achieving our own goals, even if doing so would increase the total amount of happiness. This provides an important contrast with approaches that decide what to do by aggregating benefits and harms.
Warren calls this a Personhood Only view. In its strict Kantian form, moral agency is supposed to be necessary and sufficient for any moral standing, and also necessary and sufficient for full moral standing. Kant can still condemn cruelty to animals, who are not moral agents. But Kant explains the wrong indirectly—for example, by its effects on our character and our treatment of other people—rather than by obligations we owe to the animals themselves.
Warren raises two distinct objections. First, moral agency doesn’t seem necessary for having even any moral standing: beings capable of suffering plausibly deserve some moral consideration, even if they cannot understand or act from moral principles.
Second, moral agency doesn’t seem necessary even for full moral standing: human infants and some people with profound cognitive disabilities or permanent loss of cognitive capacities are commonly regarded as having the same basic moral rights as other humans. Kant’s proposed criterion does not readily explain why. Appealing to potential moral agency may help with young children, but not with everyone who lacks moral agency.
Warren is not claiming that Kant favored mistreating those humans. Her criticism is that his proposed basis for moral standing does not adequately explain the protections we believe they deserve. She also notes a practical danger: those with social power may be quick to deny that disadvantaged people possess the rational capacities on which Kant says their rights depend.
Tom Regan was a philosopher at NC State in the late 1900s. Like Kant, Regan proposed a psychological criterion that he thought distinguishes beings with full moral rights from those without them. Warren therefore regards both Kant and Regan as defending versions of the Personhood Only view, despite their different conclusions about animals.
Regan proposed a much less demanding psychological criterion than Kant: being a subject-of-a-life. A subject-of-a-life has more than the capacity for isolated pleasant or unpleasant experiences. Such a being has an ongoing experiential life involving beliefs and desires, perception and memory, emotions, some sense of the future, and a welfare of its own. Many nonhuman animals plausibly qualify, whether or not they understand morality.
Regan held that subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value. They are not merely containers of pleasures and pains that may be sacrificed whenever doing so improves the overall balance. They have basic rights to respectful treatment. Thus, for Regan, substantial benefits to humans would not by themselves justify harmful experiments on animal subjects.
An important motivation resembles our earlier discussions of Leiber: if human infants and some adults who cannot be moral agents nevertheless have the same basic moral rights as other humans, what justifies denying those rights to nonhuman beings with comparable psychological lives? Regan argued that species membership by itself does not provide a good answer.
Notice what Regan is not saying. He does not claim that every living thing has the same rights, or that every experience of suffering requires the same response. His central claim concerns beings sufficiently psychologically developed to be subjects-of-a-life.
Nor does Regan’s claim of “equal inherent value” automatically mean that every conflict between rights has an easy solution.
Warren agrees that Regan identifies morally significant characteristics. Her objection is to making subjecthood the single criterion for full and equal basic rights. Consider several kinds of difficulty:
Protecting animals from predators. If deer have rights to life comparable to human rights, should we intervene when wolves threaten them? Regan replied that wolves are not moral agents and therefore cannot violate rights. But Warren points out that the question concerns our responsibilities, not whether wolves deserve blame. We may have reason to save other humans from a dangerous wolf even though the animal is doing nothing morally wrong. So why shouldn’t we also have reason to protect deer from wolves? A defender of animal rights can reply that intervening in predator–prey relations might cause even more suffering or damage. The harder question is whether an appeal to ecological consequences can be reconciled with equal individual rights.
Protecting ecosystems from introduced animals. In some places, introduced pigs and other animals damage ecosystems and threaten native species. Suppose nonlethal measures cannot effectively prevent the damage. Would killing the pigs be permissible? Warren thinks that in some circumstances it would be, even while recognizing that the pigs themselves matter morally. Regan opposed sacrificing the rights of individual animals for the sake of protecting species or ecosystems. This disagreement forces us to ask whether preserving species and ecosystems can justify actions that would be impermissible toward human beings with equal rights.
Conflicts with rodents. Mice and rats can threaten human food supplies and health. Warren argues that treating them always as moral equals to humans would make some conflicts practically impossible to resolve. Her argument is not simply that respecting rights may be inconvenient; it appeals to potentially serious consequences, and to the fact that negotiation with rodents is unavailable. A defender of Regan might argue that even equal rights can sometimes be overridden to prevent serious threats to human health. But would the same reasoning justify similar measures against innocent humans who posed such threats? If not, what morally relevant difference would explain why?
Where is the boundary? The capacities constituting a subject-of-a-life—memory, anticipation, desires, self-awareness—develop gradually and vary across species. There may be no sharp, nonarbitrary dividing line between creatures that possess enough of these capacities to qualify as subjects-of-a-life and creatures that do not.
A defender of Regan might reply that rights can have a threshold even when the capacities underlying them vary by degree. But where should that threshold be placed, and what would justify it?
Regan’s suggestion that we give animals the benefit of the doubt may expand the practical difficulties rather than eliminate them.
Warren’s objections should not be confused with the claim that animals have no moral standing. They challenge a more specific proposal: that all subjects-of-a-life have the same basic rights as human moral agents.
Kant’s criterion, Warren argues, is too exclusive: it does not adequately account for the full rights of some humans who lack moral agency. Regan’s is too inclusive: it extends equal basic rights to animals we cannot always treat as moral equals. Why not choose a psychological threshold somewhere between the two? Because Warren doubts that any one such threshold would include everyone we have good reason to protect fully while excluding everyone whose rights may appropriately differ.
Her Personhood Plus approach holds that moral agency is sufficient, but not necessary, for full moral standing. Every moral agent therefore qualifies for full standing, but other considerations may also justify extending it to beings that cannot be moral agents. Being a subject-of-a-life can be morally important without being either necessary or sufficient for full standing.
What are these other considerations? Warren suggests that relationships within human communities and wider biological communities may matter. The chapter we read does not fully defend those further grounds. Much of that argument is reserved for later chapters of her book, which we are not reading. Personhood Plus is therefore a proposal about the shape a satisfactory theory might have, not a completed formula for determining every creature’s rights.
The chapter leaves us with questions rather than one uncontested boundary: Does moral agency guarantee full moral standing, and if so why? Can relationships justify full moral standing without producing arbitrary favoritism? If some animals have weaker rights than humans, how should we determine which protections they deserve? And if an intelligent machine becomes a moral agent, or perhaps a being with welfare of its own, what follows about its moral standing?
Our next reading, by Parisa Moosavi, takes up a related but narrower issue: whether progress in AI gives us reason to expect machines to become moral patients — beings who matter morally in their own right, and for whom things can genuinely go better or worse.