Phil 101: Study Sheet of Concepts and Principles

The final will be cumulative. This sheet identifies important questions, distinctions, positions, and arguments from the course. It is a guide to what to review, not a self-contained account of the material, a list of claims you must accept, or a substitute for the readings, webnotes, discussions, and quiz feedback. For each item, you should be able to explain the idea in your own words, consider examples, and recognize what does—and does not—follow from it. Review terms in the contexts in which we used them, not just as isolated vocabulary.

Exam conditions. The final is closed-book, with no electronic devices. You may bring one printed and/or handwritten 8.5 × 11-inch sheet of notes, on both sides, in any font size.

Preparing your notes sheet. I recommend including compact distinctions, outlines of arguments, and examples that help you remember how to apply an idea, rather than passages to reproduce. You do not need to memorize incidental dates, page numbers, or textual details.

1. Philosophical questions and reasoning

  1. Kinds of questions: Distinguish questions about what something is or consists in (its nature), what causes or produces it, and what evidence would justify believing that it is present. Distinguish metaphysical/ontological, epistemological, and ethical questions.
  2. Definitions, analyses, and tests: Distinguish a stipulative definition, an analysis that tries to unpack an existing concept, and a practical test or criterion for recognizing something. (Why might a test be useful without defining what it tests?) Distinguish definitions and analyses from substantive or argued-for discoveries, connections, or results.
  3. Thought experiments: What is the point of a hypothetical or science-fiction case? Why needn’t it be technologically feasible? Distinguish granting the details of a case for the sake of argument from deciding what follows from them.
  4. Language and disagreement: Distinguish ambiguity, vagueness, and controversy about how a concept should be analyzed. How can equivocation undermine an argument?
  5. Arguments: Identify premises, conclusions, and assumptions, including possible implicit or unstated premises. Distinguish deductive validity, soundness, and persuasiveness. How can an argument be valid but still unconvincing? What makes an argument question-begging? What would count as a counterexample to a proposed analysis or claim?
  6. Conditionals and proofs: Distinguish antecedent and consequent, necessary and sufficient conditions, a conditional from its converse and contrapositive, and a conditional from a biconditional (if and only if, or iff). Recognize a reductio argument. Be able to tell what follows from a conditional and what does not.
  7. What a view or argument establishes: Distinguish a theory’s requiring a claim, merely allowing it, and being incompatible with it. Distinguish a false or unsupported premise from an invalid inference; an objection that presents a challenge or difficulty from a conclusive refutation; and failure to establish P from establishing that P is false.

2. Mental states, contents, and knowledge of other minds

  1. Kinds of mentality: What is a mind, and how does it relate to particular mental states, properties, and capacities? Distinguish episodic/occurrent from standing/dispositional mental states or properties. How do thinking, learning, reasoning, and problem-solving relate to other kinds of mentality?
  2. Attitudes, propositions, and content: Distinguish representational (contentful, propositional, intentional) states or attitudes from the propositions or contents they concern. What distinguishes believing, wanting, fearing, or remembering that something is so? What makes a state intentional (about or directed at something)?
  3. Experiences: Distinguish representational attitudes from qualitative/phenomenal feelings, sensations, and experiences. Why needn’t evidence of sophisticated thought or behavior automatically be evidence of conscious experience?
  4. Privacy and first-person access: In what different senses might mental states be private, or our access to our own states special/privileged? How does knowledge of our own experiences compare with evidence about other minds? Distinguish certainty or proof from reasonable grounds for belief.
  5. Mentality and its evidence: Distinguish what is necessary for mentality, what would suffice for it, and what merely makes it reasonable to attribute mentality. How can evidence be significant without being conclusive? Why doesn’t lack of one kind of evidence imply a complete lack of evidence?

3. Animal minds, behavior, language, and experiments

  1. Sources of evidence: What could an animal’s physical/biological makeup, nonverbal behavior (including learning and problem-solving), and communication or language use tell us about its mind? What could each source leave unsettled?
  2. Clever Hans and experimental controls: How could we distinguish competing explanations of apparently intelligent behavior? Recall the importance of separating factors that normally occur together and specifying what each hypothesis predicts. When can an animal’s failure to behave as we predicted give us positive evidence against attributing a particular ability to it, rather than merely leaving us without evidence that it has that ability?
  3. Deception and understanding others: Distinguish behavior that manages to mislead another animal, behavior intended to influence another animal, and behavior guided by a representation of the other’s beliefs. What different evidence would these interpretations require?
  4. What animals represent: Why might choices, searches, or mistakes provide evidence that an animal represents something without determining exactly what content it represents? How can an incorrect search or false belief sometimes be positive evidence of representation?
  5. Language and thought: Distinguish meaningful communication from fully developed human-style language. Does thought require language? Might language extend or reshape thought?
  6. Comparing species and nervous systems: Why does Searle regard biological similarities as relevant evidence of mentality? What challenges do Godfrey-Smith’s octopuses pose for simple comparisons with human brains? What does the distributed control of their arms establish—and not establish—about the whole animal?

4. Ontology, identity, and the mind–body debate

  1. Ontological categories: Distinguish abstract from concrete entities; individuals/substances, events/states/processes, properties and relations, and facts and propositions. How do properties and relations differ from the things that have them?
  2. Properties: Distinguish intrinsic properties from extrinsic/relational properties. How could something gain or lose a property merely because something else changed, without undergoing any change in itself?
  3. Kinds and instances: Distinguish a type from its particular tokens (for example, a laptop model versus individual laptops, or an event-type versus a particular occurrence). How might the distinction apply to programs and their executions?
  4. Substances and derivative entities: What makes a substance different from a derivative object such as a wrinkle, wave, knot, or hole? How does a person’s needing food and water to survive differ from how a wrinkle depends on the carpet, or a smile depends on the face, for its existence?
  5. Dualism and materialism: Distinguish substance dualism from materialism/physicalism (a form of substance monism). What claims about a soul, a mind, and a body do these views require, allow, or reject? Can a materialist accept mental states without taking a mind to be an additional substance? Must a dualist deny that a person has physical properties?
  6. Continuity and explanatory simplicity: How does the continuity of nature, including evolution and similarities between humans and other animals, provide an argument or pressure for materialism? What role might Ockham’s Razor play, and why does its force depend on what the competing theories explain?
  7. Two kinds of identity and Leibniz’s Law: Distinguish qualitative identity (being duplicates or alike in relevant respects) from numerical identity (being one and the same thing). What does Leibniz’s Law (the “indiscernibility of identicals”) allow us to infer from a genuine difference in properties? Does Leibniz’s Law prohibit change over time? If two things have the same properties, can we use Leibniz’s Law to conclude that they are one and the same thing? How does that differ from what Leibniz’s Law actually says?
  8. Illegitimate uses of Leibniz’s Law: Distinguish P from I know/discovered/think that P. Why might one description or name of a person prompt different knowledge or doubts from another, even when both refer to the same person (as with a reporter and Superman)? Why is a difference between doubts about your existence and doubts about your body’s existence not automatically a difference between your properties and your body’s?
  9. The divisibility argument and its limits: How does the alleged lack of parts of the mind figure in an argument that it is not the brain? What can introspection justify, and what might be an unsupported premise?
  10. Even if some argument established that you are not identical with a brain or body, what further premises would be needed to establish that you are, or have, a distinct nonphysical substance?

5. Mental causation and challenges to dualism

  1. Interactionism and epiphenomenalism: Distinguish a view on which a nonphysical soul causally interacts with (including influencing) the physical world from one on which mental states are only effects of physical events without themselves producing any physical effects. What are the attractions and difficulties of each?
  2. Three challenges to interaction: What distinct problems are posed by Princess Elisabeth’s question about causal influence across the mind/body gap, Kim’s Pairing Problem (why this soul affects this body), and van Inwagen’s remote-control comparison?
  3. Physical causal closure: What does it mean to claim that physical events are causally closed? Why is it not enough that most physical events have physical explanations? What options does this leave a dualist interactionist?
  4. Overdetermination (overcausing): What is the worry if a soul and an already complete physical cause each cause the same bodily event—and this happens routinely? How does that differ from saying a soul occasionally fills a gap in physical causation? How might Ockham’s Razor strengthen the objection to routine overcausing, and what would a dualist need to say in response?
  5. Evaluating proposed replies: If a dualist identifies a particular point in the brain where the soul acts, which difficulties might that address, and which remain?

6. Computers, the Turing Test, and theories of thinking

  1. The Turing Test: How does Turing’s imitation game work, and what would reliably impressive performance establish? Why isn’t either a brief success or a clever question that exposes a limitation decisive? Distinguish claims that passing is necessary for thinking, sufficient for thinking, or good but defeasible evidence of thinking.
  2. Algorithms and implementation: What is an algorithm, and what makes a physical system implement one? What roles do internal states and transition rules play? Why isn’t producing a matching input/output pattern by itself enough to show that two systems use the same algorithm?
  3. Programs, runs, and hardware: Distinguish an abstract program (a recipe that might remain unused or be run many times), an individual run or process of executing, and the hardware carrying it out. Why can the same program be implemented on different physical hardware?
  4. Behavior and competing theories: Distinguish what a system actually does from what it is disposed to do across possible situations. How would a behaviorist interpret reliably passing the Turing Test, compared with someone who treats it as evidence of a further capacity? Why does a functionalist think we also need to consider the processes going on inside a system, and how its internal states interact with one another? How does that differ from the view that the particular physical materials or processes implementing a computation can themselves matter to whether the system has mental states?
  5. Machines, errors, and surprises: Why is it mistaken to assume that a machine cannot make mistakes, even when given correct inputs? Distinguish errors of functioning (something goes wrong in carrying out the program) from errors of conclusion (the program operates as intended but produces a mistaken answer). Why needn’t programmers have individually chosen or foreseen every machine result?
  6. Different ways to produce intelligent-looking behavior: Compare a giant lookup table, a large language model, and programs that use more elaborate rules or structures, perhaps resembling some mechanisms or algorithms used by our brains. Distinguish giving the kinds of answers a thinker would give, carrying out a particular computation, and genuinely thinking or understanding. Why might theorists disagree about which of these go together?

7. Searle’s Chinese Room and replies

  1. The Chinese Room: How does the case work? What is Searle’s argument that following rules for manipulating symbols/numbers need not yield understanding or “original” (genuine, non-borrowed) intentionality? Is he arguing that no artificial machine could ever think?
  2. The Systems Reply: Why might the whole organized system understand Chinese even if the human operator (Jack) does not? Why does failure to find understanding in any one component not automatically show that the system lacks it?
  3. Internalizing the room: What does Searle think follows if Jack memorizes the instructions and performs all the operations mentally? How might a defender of the Systems Reply answer, by distinguishing Jack from the system he implements (as with an emulated computer)?
  4. Computation and physical implementation: Why does Searle think that two systems might carry out exactly the same patterns of computation yet differ in whether they genuinely understand? What further features of how a system is physically constituted and operates might matter?

8. Persons, moral consideration, and animal or machine interests

  1. Three personhood questions: Distinguish being human, being a person in the psychological sense, and having the moral standing or rights associated with personhood. Why does performing like a human in conversation not by itself settle all three questions?
  2. Moral standing Distinguish being a moral agent (able to understand and act on moral reasons) from being a moral patient (whose treatment can matter morally for its own sake). Distinguish having interests/welfare, having those interests morally count, possessing rights, and having rights that are absolute.
  3. Harm, suffering, and wronging: Distinguish causing suffering, harming, and wronging. Can someone be harmed without being wronged, be wronged without suffering, or be made to suffer without being wronged? What moral questions remain once we have evidence that a being can suffer?
  4. Reasons to protect animals: Distinguish direct reasons concerning an animal’s welfare from indirect reasons concerning effects on humans. How do Heller’s pictures of animals as peers and humans as protectors differ? How might an approach that puts special weight on preventing suffering assess causing an animal pain differently from killing it painlessly? What other considerations might matter to the moral assessment of killing?
  5. Leiber’s Washoe-Delta and AL: How do comparisons with humans of similar capacities challenge Goodman’s position about personhood? What do the contrasts between Washoe-Delta and AL suggest about evolution, training, and design as evidence? Why doesn’t rejecting prejudice against artificial origins by itself establish AL’s consciousness?
  6. Tests for AI consciousness: What capacities were probed by the experiments in Seven Tests That Could Prove an AI Is Conscious (for example, tradeoffs, tracking what other people are in a position to know, and self-reports about the AI’s internal processes)? What alternative explanations of the observed results might prevent stronger inferences about the AIs’ experiences?

9. Warren on full and equal moral standing

  1. Kant and moral agency: How does the view Warren attributes to Kant link moral agency, personhood, and moral standing? What indirect reasons against cruelty to animals might it acknowledge? What are Warren’s two objections to requiring moral agency—one about having any standing and another about having full standing?
  2. Regan’s subject-of-a-life: What qualifies as a subject-of-a-life, and why does Regan ascribe equal inherent value and basic rights to such beings? How does his approach differ from simply adding up good and bad consequences?
  3. Warren’s objections to Regan: What problems arise from predation, introduced species and ecosystems, conflicts involving rodents, and drawing a sharp psychological boundary? Why doesn’t noting that predators are not moral agents by itself answer what we should do?
  4. Personhood Only and Personhood Plus: Why does Warren regard Kant’s criterion as too exclusive and Regan’s as too inclusive? What does it mean to make moral agency sufficient but not necessary for full moral standing? What further considerations might bear on standing? Be able to distinguish what each theory requires, permits, and leaves open.

10. Moosavi on future AI moral patients

  1. Moral patients and their own good: What is the difference between something’s mattering morally in its own right and its being benefited by how we treat it? Why might we have reason to preserve a painting, without thereby doing anything good for the painting itself? Why does Moosavi think a moral patient must have a good of its own, and why is that a necessary rather than sufficient condition?
  2. Consciousness and approaches to patiency: Why does Moosavi consider, without endorsing, the view that an organism without conscious experiences might nevertheless have a good of its own? What distinguishes assessing imagined AIs with stipulated abilities from asking what actual AI developments give us reason to expect? Why does she resist simply revising our criteria of moral patiency to track relationships or behavior?
  3. Artifacts, functions, and interests: Distinguish an artifact’s causal dependence on designers from the constitutive dependence of its functions or goals on other agents’ purposes. Why doesn’t being made or bred by humans settle whether an entity has welfare? Does having sophisticated functions by itself establish welfare?
  4. Machine learning and goals: Why might new strategies, intermediate goals, or resistance to shutdown fail to show that continued operation is good for the machine itself? Distinguish independence from direct human control from nonderivative goals or a good of one’s own.
  5. Behavior and evidence of experience: How does Moosavi appeal to firsthand knowledge of our own experiences, shared biology, and evolutionary history when discussing other animals? How might deliberate training to imitate the behavior of humans and other animals we take to have conscious experiences affect the evidence supplied by a machine’s behavior? Is she claiming that biology is required for consciousness, or making a claim about our evidence for it?
  6. Her two arguments and their limits: Distinguish the developmental argument (what progress in familiar machine-learning methods establishes) from the evidential argument (what increasingly humanlike behavior warrants us in believing). How do they support her conclusion that we lack good grounds to expect future AI moral patients? Why is that not a proof of impossibility?
  7. Remaining questions: What new developments or evidence might change that assessment? Does Moosavi settle whether we should take precautions when a machine’s moral standing is uncertain? What would we need to consider separately in deciding how to act under uncertainty?

11. Connections across the course

  1. Be able to reconstruct authors’ arguments fairly regardless of whether you accept them.
  2. Capacity, nature, and evidence: What does a behavior or experiment show about a system’s capacities, what those capacities consist in, and what we are justified in attributing to it? Keep apart modest and richer attributions, and evidence from proof.
  3. Origins and what they show: When does how a being was made, evolved, trained, or programmed provide evidence about its capacities or welfare? Why needn’t differences in origin guarantee differences in what is possible for the beings concerned?
  4. From minds to morals: What additional moral premises are needed to move from a claim about thought, consciousness, or welfare to claims about what morally matters, what rights a creature has, or why it has full moral standing?